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COMMENTARIES
Comments
HON. ROBERT D. MARTINt
We are assembled in large part because we are friends
and admirers of Professor LoPucki.
I assume that my place on this august panel is due to
my unusual occupation. So, I will speak from the point of
view that it affords me. I hope I will be excused for sound-
ing a little defensive.
I have been a bankruptcy judge for twenty-seven years
and have known some three hundred bankruptcy judges
well enough to believe that I have some knowledge of their
personality and character. There have probably been an-
other two- to three-hundred bankruptcy judges during that
time whom I did not know as well. Of all the judges I have
known, some-three or four-were corrupt. They were cor-
rupt because they accepted bribes or kickbacks in exchange
for the appointment of particular trustees and appraisers,
or for otherwise skewing the outcome in cases before them.
Each of those corrupt judges was either denied reappoint-
ment or removed from office. I have also known the judges
identified specifically or referred to generally in Professor
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LoPucki's book,1 and I have known them well enough to
form an opinion as to their personality and character. I do
not believe any of them to be or to have been corrupt.
Nor are they venal. Assigning venal motives to the
judges who have made decisions or adopted procedures
which are at odds with the scheme set out in the Bank-
ruptcy Code is to do so without any evidence. I have never
known a judge to decide matters in favor of the debtor for
the specific reasons that it will get her name in the Wall
Street Journal or the New York Times, or that it will in-
crease the probability of his reappointment, or more specifi-
cally, that it will earn her the opportunity to get a job with
a high paying law firm like the one which she may have left
to go on the bankruptcy bench. To suggest that those are
the motives for bankruptcy judges' decisions 2 and to suggest
it over and over again throughout the book is one of the
weakest parts of Professor LoPucki's study. It is at best a
bad guess as to what motivates judges to make decisions. It
is in any case an unnecessary and vicious attack on people
whose service is undertaken with dedication and sacrifice,
and not for personal aggrandizement.
The second major area in which I take issue with Pro-
fessor LoPucki's study is his willingness to place all the
blame for the corrupting decisions on the bankruptcy
judges. 3 Certainly he is correct that decisions have been
made which are not well founded in law and which are
beneficial to debtors or, as he calls them, "case placers." But
to suggest that the cause of all these bad decisions is the
judges, whether they are self-interested or not, fails to rec-
ognize the complexity of judicial decision-making. While dif-
ferent decisions might have slowed or even stopped some
erosion of what LoPucki perceives to be the correct route for
bankruptcy law to have taken, it is unfair to suggest that
the judges made this up on their own. Responsibility should
be borne by the lawyers who raise arguments without any
valid legal support, who fail to accept settled law as settled,
and who advocate on behalf of a client not based on the law
1. See LYNN M. LoPUcKI, COURTING FAILURE: How COMPETITION FOR BIG
CASES IS CORRUPTING THE BANKRuPTcY COURT (2005).
2. See id. at 20.
3. See id. at 24.
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or the intention of the law, but upon the inability of oppo-
nents to afford to counter the aggressive thrust. What role
do the lenders have who, rather than recognizing the con-
tracts into which they entered and the rights they were
given in terms of the existing law, seek advantages based
solely on their economic power? And what of the vulture
funds, claims traders, investment bankers, and turnaround
managers who circle the debtors pre- and post-bankruptcy?
The changes in the economic and professional landscape
since 1979 have arisen for many reasons, one of the least of
which is the judicial interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code.
To say that the bankruptcy judges could have stopped
all of the abuses is like saying that the current tragedy in
New Orleans is due to the failure of the levees. Certainly
the bankruptcy judges represent-in some instances-the
last clear chance to defend the scheme that Congress cre-
ated. However, just as the levees broke only when there
was a Category Five hurricane, the bankruptcy courts have
demonstrated their weakness only in the face of an enor-
mous onslaught. I agree with Professor LoPucki that the
bankruptcy law now practiced in large Chapter 11 cases
bears little relationship to the statutory text, 4 but to say
that that is because the bankruptcy judges-for self-
interested reasons-failed to protect the law5 is to assign
far too much blame to one of the most innocent, but highly
stressed, components of the structure.
4. See id. at 139.
5. See id. at 20, 137.
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